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After the Supreme Court handed down its split 5–4 decision in Massa-
chusetts v. EPA,1 various media outlets trumpeted the significance of the 
case.  As one example, the Chicago Tribune proclaimed:  “EPA must regu-
late greenhouse gases.”2  The problem, of course, is that the Court said no 
such thing.  To be sure, the Court determined that greenhouses gases were 
“air pollutants” within the meaning of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).3  But the 
Court’s opinion did not order the EPA to regulate with respect to climate 
change.  Rather, the ruling remands the case to allow the agency to recon-
sider its denial of a petition to regulate the emissions of four pollutants as-
sociated with climate change from mobile sources under Section 202 of the 
CAA.4  The ruling, in other words, leaves the EPA free to decide not to 
regulate, so long as it provides adequate justification for its decision.  This 
means that what the media has touted as the “global warming” case may not 
actually lead to the regulation of global warming at all under the current 
CAA.5 
 
*  Visiting Assistant Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. 
**  Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law.  Much of the dis-
cussion on state standing is based on Professor Wildermuth’s larger project, Why State Standing in Mas-
sachusetts v. EPA Matters, which will appear this summer in the JOURNAL OF LAND, RESOURCES AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. 
1  127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (link). 
2  Michael Hawthorne, EPA Must Regulate Greenhouse Gases, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 3, 2007, at 
3 (link). 
3  Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1460. 
4  42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (link). 
5  Whether the decision will prompt regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under a different regula-
tory regime is another question.  Given the heightened national attention on this issue, the EPA’s view 
that regulating greenhouse gases under the current CAA would be awkward, and the industry’s interest 
in specific climate change legislation, it is no surprise that Congress seems inspired to do something 
about climate change.  Accordingly, we think that in the not-too-distant future Congress will enact a 
new, comprehensive climate change statute that will likely have as its central feature a cap-and-trade 
program. 
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So wherein lies the true significance of the case?  We believe that the 
long-term significance of the case is likely to be the opinion’s impact on 
two doctrinal areas of the law:  (1) the standing of states; and (2) the stan-
dard of review applied to denials of petitions for rulemaking.  First, al-
though we have some questions about the Court’s reasoning, we are 
encouraged to see the beginning of a framework for evaluating state stand-
ing based on the interest of the state in the litigation.  Second, with respect 
to judicial review of agency inaction in the rulemaking context, the Court’s 
decision breaks new ground by not only confirming the reviewability of an 
agency’s denial of a rulemaking petition but also by closely scrutinizing the 
reasons that the EPA offered for its decision to decline to regulate. 
I. STATE’S SPECIAL STANDING 
A. The Court’s Analysis 
The Court’s approach to standing—although foreshadowed during oral 
argument—was somewhat unusual.6  Although there were several petition-
ers—twelve states,7 several environmental and citizen groups, the District 
of Columbia, American Samoa Government, New York City, and the 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore—the Court’s standing analysis fo-
cused on the petitioning states, specifically one state:  Massachusetts.8  
What is interesting about the Court’s approach is that it blended the conven-
tional Lujan analysis—requiring injury-in-fact, causation, and redressabil-
ity—found in Judge Tatel’s dissent in the lower court9 with an argument 
made by, among others, the Amici States of Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, 
Minnesota, and Wisconsin that the Court should base the standing analysis 
on the state’s sovereign interest at stake in the litigation.10 
In particular, the Court first noted the importance of “the special posi-
tion and interest of Massachusetts,”11 and analogized Massachusetts’s inter-
est to the “quasi-sovereign” interest of the state in Georgia v. Tennessee 
Cooper Co.12  It then analyzed the alleged injury to Massachusetts’s coastal 
 
6  Justice Kennedy foreshadowed the Court’s ultimate approach by asking about one of the key cases 
noted in the opinion, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (link), at oral argument.  
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120) (link). 
7  The 12 states were Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.  127 S. Ct. at 1446 n.2. 
8  Because the same relief was sought by all Petitioners, only one Petitioner had to demonstrate 
standing in order to bring this suit.  See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 
S. Ct. 1297, 1303 n.2 (2006). 
9  Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 64–67 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
10  See Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15–25, Mas-
sachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2563380 (link).  Professor Wildermuth served as 
Counsel of Record for the Amici States. 
11  Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454. 
12  206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
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lands under the Lujan test.13  This loss, as Chief Justice Roberts noted in 
dissent, was predicted by models to be 20 to 70 centimeters of coastal land 
by 2100, at best.14 
The dissent detailed several objections to the Court’s standing analysis 
but its central point was that the ultimate result of the case was to “[r]elax[] 
Article III standing requirements” generally for states.15  If this is true—and 
it seems at least some relaxation is the result given the rather small and re-
mote injury here—we wonder why the Court was willing to take this step. 
B. An Explanation? 
In an effort to explain the Court’s decision, we look to a case cited in 
the Massachusetts decision, Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex 
rel Barez.16  Snapp involved whether Puerto Rico could sue several Virginia 
apple growers on behalf of its citizens because, it was alleged, Puerto Rican 
migrant workers were being discriminated against in favor of foreign work-
ers in violation of federal law.  In the course of deciding that Puerto Rico 
could bring the suit, the Court divided potential interests of a sovereign into 
three categories:  (1) proprietary interests; (2) quasi-sovereign interests; and 
(3) sovereign interests.17  We believe these three categories are helpful as a 
descriptive matter but, more importantly, as a framework for evaluating 
state standing. 
1. Proprietary Interests.—In the first category are proprietary inter-
ests such as ownership of land or participation in a business venture.  Be-
cause a state asserting a proprietary interest is asserting the same kind of 
interest that a private party would, we see no reason in these cases to treat a 
state as “special.”  Accordingly, it appears to us that when a state brings suit 
on this basis, the standing analysis should proceed as it would if the plain-
tiff were a private party, i.e., evaluating the state’s contentions under 
Lujan.18 
 
13  We note that the factual basis for the Court’s standing analysis was provided by affidavits submit-
ted by the petitioners, and those allegations were unopposed by the respondents.  A substantial question 
remains regarding how an appellate court reviewing an administrative action ought to handle a situation 
in which a respondent contests the facts asserted by a petitioner with submissions of its own.  See 13A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE  § 3531.15, at 105 (2d ed. Supp. 
2007). 
14  Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1467 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
15  Id. at 1464. 
16  458 U.S. 592 (1982) (link). 
17  Id. at 601–02. 
18  Cf. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 506 (1995) 
(suggesting that it would be appropriate to analyze state standing based on traditional common-law in-
terests in property and liberty under a modified Lujan test); Snapp, 458 U.S. at 611 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (“At the very least, the prerogative of a State to bring suits in federal court should be 
commensurate with the ability of private organizations.  A private organization may bring suit to vindi-
cate its own concrete interest in performing those activities for which it was formed.”). 
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2. Quasi-Sovereign Interests.—In the second category are suits based 
on quasi-sovereign interests.  The Court has never precisely defined these 
interests, but has instructed that they generally “consist of a set of interests 
that the State has in the well-being of its populace.”19  For example, these 
interests include a state’s interest in the health and well-being of its citizens 
in a public nuisance suit for transboundary pollution,20 or its interest in see-
ing that its residents are not excluded from the benefits that flow from par-
ticipation in the federal system.21 
The roots of a state’s interest to bring suits based on its quasi-sovereign 
interests—that is, to bring suit to protect its residents—are found in “[t]he 
royal prerogative, [which] included the right or responsibility to take care of 
persons who ‘are legally unable, on account of mental incapacity.’”22  The 
modern version of the royal prerogative is commonly known as parens pa-
triae standing, but the ability of a sovereign to bring suit as parens patriae 
no longer requires that the persons represented by the state be unable to rep-
resent themselves.  Instead, in order for a state to have parens patriae stand-
ing today, “the State must assert an injury to . . . a ‘quasi-sovereign’ 
interest,” that is, an interest related to the well-being of its residents.23 
As Professor Thomas Merrill has explained, suits based on quasi-
sovereign interests, such as public nuisance suits, “should be exempt from 
the standing limitations that apply to citizen suits when public officers sue 
in the courts of their own sovereign.”24  This is so because these suits are 
the civil analog to criminal prosecutions, and courts have never required the 
sovereign to satisfy Lujan-type requirements in those kinds of cases.25  In 
contrast, when a state brings suit based on a quasi-sovereign interest in the 
courts of another sovereign—like Connecticut has done by filing a public 
nuisance action against several power companies in federal court for cli-
mate change injuries26—it is unclear whether the state should be required to 
satisfy the Lujan requirements.  We see two possibilities here. 
 
19  Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602. 
20  See Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 
303 n.44 (2005) (listing the following transboundary cases that fit this mold:  “North Dakota v. Minne-
sota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (flooding); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (water pollution); 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (air pollution in Georgia caused by discharge of 
noxious gases from the defendant’s plant in Tennessee); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (di-
version of water), [sic] Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (sought to enjoin defendants from dis-
charging sewage in such a way as to pollute the Mississippi river in Missouri)”). 
21  Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607–08. 
22  Id. at 600 (quoting J. CHITTY, PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN 155 (1820)). 
23  Id. at 601. 
24  Merrill, supra note 20, at 304. 
25  Id. at 300–01.  
26  See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing suit be-
cause court concluded case raised non-justiciable political questions beyond limits of court’s jurisdic-
tion), appeal pending, No. 05-5104 (2d Cir. argued on June 7, 2006). 
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First, one might conclude that a state need not satisfy the standing re-
quirements when asserting a quasi-sovereign interest no matter where the 
state files suit.  This is supported by several federal cases like Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Co.27 that, although lacking any explicit consideration of 
the issue, never hinted at a problem with states bringing these kinds of suits.  
Before drawing too many conclusions based on the lack of discussion in 
those cases, however, it should be noted that these cases predate Lujan, 
many by more than 50 years. 
Second, another option would be to conclude—as Professor Merrill has 
recommended—that a state suing in federal court to vindicate a quasi-
sovereign interest “should be subject to the same Article III and prudential 
standing limitations that apply to suits by aggrieved citizens.”28  These Arti-
cle III requirements could be satisfied “either by showing that the State it-
self has suffered some injury in fact from the challenged action, or by suing 
in a representational capacity and showing that the State’s citizens have suf-
fered some injury in fact from the challenged action.”29  This solution is 
more in keeping with modern standing analysis than the alternative ap-
proach.  Moreover, given the alleged injuries, their alleged causes, and the 
relief sought in prior cases in which a state asserted a quasi-sovereign inter-
est, either the state or its residents likely would have satisfied the Lujan re-
quirements.30 
One final issue remains:  does a state have standing as parens patriae 
to bring an action against the federal government?  Because a state’s quasi-
sovereign interests are based on protecting “the well-being of its popu-
lace,”31 it seems to follow that a state would not be permitted to bring suit 
as parens patriae against the federal government because the federal gov-
ernment is not only charged with the same obligation to protect those resi-
dents, but it typically stands in a superior position to that of the states to do 
so.32  The Court seemed to lean in this direction in cases prior to Massachu-
setts, noting, for example in Massachusetts v. Mellon, that when it comes to 
 
27  Merrill, supra note 20, at 305 n.56 (citing same list of cases as discussed supra note 20); see also 
Snapp, 458 U.S. 592. 
28  Merrill, supra note 20, at 305. 
29  Id. 
30  Merrill, supra note 20, at 306.  One wonders, however, what incentive a state might have to assert 
a quasi-sovereign interest when it will nevertheless be required to satisfy the Lujan requirements.  Cf. 
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 18, at 511–12 (“[S]tates that now litigate on the basis of parens pa-
triae often have an independent basis for standing . . . . Where a state has an independent legally pro-
tected interest, there is arguably no harm in allowing a state to sue additionally as parens patriae.  Such 
standing is analogous to that of private parties who have individually suffered harms suing as represen-
tatives of a class.”).  We return to this issue below. 
31  Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602. 
32  See id. at 610 n.10.  
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protecting citizens’ rights, “it is the United States, and not the State, which 
represents them as parens patriae.”33 
3. Sovereign Interests.—In the third and final category are a state’s 
sovereign interests, which include “the power to create and enforce a legal 
code, both civil and criminal” and the power to demand “recognition from 
other sovereigns.”34  The best example of this is a criminal prosecution as 
Professor Merrill has explained: 
A U.S. Attorney authorized by law to bring a federal criminal prosecution has 
never been, nor should be, required to demonstrate that the United States has 
suffered injury in fact, or that the crime caused this injury, or that a conviction 
will redress such an injury, or that the crime is not a generalized grievance.35 
It is clear based on this long-standing practice that when a state asserts a 
sovereign interest, at least in its own courts, it need not satisfy the Lujan re-
quirements. 
When a state does not sue the federal government in its own courts, 
however, questions arise surrounding whether a Mellon-type bar should 
prevent the suit, and if not, whether the state must satisfy the Lujan re-
quirements.  We think there should be no Mellon-type bar when a state—
instead of relying upon parens patriae standing to assert a quasi-sovereign 
interest—asserts its own sovereign interest or its own proprietary interest in 
a suit against the federal government.36  This is because a state suing the 
federal government based on a sovereign interest is asserting its own inter-
est, not a derivative, quasi-sovereign interest based on preventing harm to 
its citizens. 
We also think that when a state sues the federal government because 
federal law or administrative action regulates the state administrative ma-
chinery directly or otherwise undermines the state’s independence in the 
federal system—such as, for example, by potentially preempting state 
law—the state may bring suit without reference to the Lujan analysis.37  In 
our system of dual sovereignty, the federal government has certain enumer-
ated powers, one of which is the “undoubted power”38 under the Supremacy 
Clause39 to trump state law in certain instances.  Under the Tenth Amend-
 
33  262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923) (link). 
34  Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601. 
35  Merrill, supra note 20, at 300–01. 
36  See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 18, at 510. 
37  Cf. id. at 510 (noting that “[a]llowing state standing when the federal government acts on state 
governmental machinery similarly expresses the norms that governments should act independently and 
that the states may have certain constitutionally based rights to complain in federal court”); id. at 511 & 
n.492 (commenting that “courts have historically allowed states standing as ‘aggrieved parties’ that can 
contest federal administrative action under a variety of statutes”). 
38  Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 887 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (link). 
39  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (link) (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
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ment,40 however, “states retain all governmental power except that power 
otherwise explicitly reserved to the federal government by the Constitu-
tion,”41 and “the structure of the constitutional system assumes that each of 
the states will maintain a sovereign status independent of the national gov-
ernment.”42  That is, although federal law may preempt state law, the state 
nevertheless has a sovereign interest in preserving its own law, even if ulti-
mately unsuccessful.43  Given this relationship and the importance of the 
state’s interest in protecting its laws, it should be sufficient for Article III 
purposes that a state brings suit on this basis. 
C. Applying Snapp to Massachusetts 
Applying this framework to Massachusetts, the first issue is to properly 
identify Massachusetts’s interest at stake in the case.  The Court labeled the 
relevant interest as quasi-sovereign.  Although the Chief Justice faulted the 
majority for failing to identify a proper quasi-sovereign interest,44 Massa-
chusetts’s quasi-sovereign interest could be “in the health and well-being . . 
. of its residents in general”45 based on Massachusetts’s desire to protect 
them from the harms of global warming.46  Alternatively, given the Court’s 
observation that the federal government has an obligation to protect Massa-
chusetts under the CAA,47 the state’s interest could be in protecting its resi-
dents by “securing observance of the terms under which it participates in 
the federal system.”48 
The next question is the proper standing analysis.  As noted above, one 
might suggest that once Massachusetts asserted a quasi-sovereign interest, it 
did not need to demonstrate that it satisfied the Lujan requirements.  The 
fact that the Court turned to the Lujan analysis after its discussion of the in-
terest at stake, however, seems to foreclose that option.  Accordingly, the 
better reading of the opinion is that it adopted Professor Merrill’s sugges-
                                                                                                                           
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing.”). 
40  U.S. Const. amend. X (link) (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
41  Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly:  Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 
B.U. L. REV. 559, 568 (1997). 
42  Id. 
43  See Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding states had 
standing because the agency “claim[ed] that its rules preempt state consumer protection statutes.”); Flor-
ida v. Weinberger, 492 F.2d 488, 492 (11th Cir. 1974) (finding state could bring suit because “[t]here is 
nothing abstract about this disagreement, and the Secretary has set a collision course with Florida law in 
a formal and final regulation which is backed by grave sanctions and which demands, if valid, immedi-
ate compliance”). 
44  Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1466 (2007)  (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
45  Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel Barez, 458 U.S 592, 607 (1982). 
46  See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454 (quoting Snapp’s health and welfare discussion).   
47  Id. 
48  Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607–08. 
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tion that a state suing on the basis of a quasi-sovereign interest in federal 
court must demonstrate standing either based on its own injury or one to its 
residents.49  Here, the Court looked to Massachusetts’s interest in its coastal 
lands for the Lujan analysis. 
The Court’s Lujan analysis, however, is much less restrictive than past 
applications of the test in that Massachusetts’s harm was relatively small 
and fairly remote.  This relaxation was not part of Professor Merrill’s analy-
sis, and it is not immediately obvious to us why the Court would adopt a 
“Lujan-lite” here (and possibly, as the Chief Justice suggested, in every 
case in which a state is the plaintiff), other than a desire to generally loosen 
the standing requirements.  The more lenient Lujan-lite analysis that courts 
apparently are now to apply when states assert a quasi-sovereign interest 
may well give states a strategic incentive to assert quasi-sovereign interests, 
even though the analysis will still turn on their proprietary interests.  We, 
however, do not view this move as a significant rewriting of the law since 
the Court’s embrace of a Lujan-lite standard seems to only affect the 
“mood” courts are to follow when applying the preexisting Lujan test. 
In contrast, we are far more puzzled by the Court’s apparent lifting of 
the bar to a state suing the federal government on the basis of a quasi-
sovereign interest using parens patriae standing.  This is the most difficult 
aspect of the standing analysis to understand.  Instead of explaining its re-
sult by, for example, reasoning that sovereigns need to be able to protect 
their residents from the federal government in the complicated modern fed-
eral administrative system, the Court insists that the difference in this case 
is that a state may not sue the federal government based on its interest in 
protecting its citizens but it may sue the federal government “when it as-
sert[s] its [own] rights under federal law.”50  That sounds like the assertion 
of a sovereign interest, i.e., where the federal legislation directly operates 
on a state and the state asserts its own legally protected interest in response.  
As we noted above, there is no bar to suing the federal government when a 
state asserts a sovereign interest.  But the Court specifically identified Mas-
sachusetts’s relevant interest as a quasi-sovereign interest, not a sovereign 
interest. 
This confusion may well be the result of unfortunate language in 
Snapp.  The Court in Snapp defined quasi-sovereign interests broadly as 
“interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace.”51  But later 
the Court tells us that quasi-sovereign interests can include interests that 
apparently bear no relation to a state’s residents:  “[A] State has a quasi-
sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status 
within the federal system.”52 
 
49  Merrill, supra note 20, at 305. 
50  Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 n.17. 
51  Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602. 
52  Id. at 607. 
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On closer examination, however, it is clear that the Court’s cases on 
quasi-sovereign interests always refer to an interest related to a state’s resi-
dents rather than simply the state’s own interest.  The cases listed in support 
of the Court’s statements regarding this interest, in fact, all reference im-
pacts on the residents of the state involved.53  Moreover, the Court itself re-
states this interest, more correctly we believe, as “assuring that the benefits 
of the federal system are not denied to its general population.”54  In short, 
while the Court was not as careful as it could have been in Snapp, it is clear 
that quasi-sovereign interests must always relate back to a state’s residents. 
This, in turn, leads to the bigger question of whether any of the state 
petitioners asserted a sovereign—as opposed to a quasi-sovereign—interest 
in Massachusetts.  A possible sovereign interest could be the interest of 
California and other states in preserving their state laws from being trumped 
by federal agency action. 
The CAA reflects a special respect for state sovereignty by allowing 
states to adopt their own air pollution standards in certain circumstances.  
Section 209(b)(1) allows California55 to set its own motor vehicle emissions 
standards if those standards meet certain requirements, such as being con-
sistent with Section 202.  Other states are permitted under Section 177 to 
“piggyback” on California’s action so long as they adopt emissions stan-
dards identical to those implemented by California.56  Since California 
adopted emissions limits on greenhouse gases released from new motor ve-
hicles sold in California beginning with the 2009 model year,57 eleven states 
have adopted emissions standards identical to California’s,58 and six more 
are considering adopting them.59  Although California had applied for ap-
proval of its new standards in December 2005,60 the EPA would not con-
sider California’s request because its regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions was flatly inconsistent with the EPA’s reading of Section 202 in 
 
53  Id.at 608. 
54  Id. 
55  See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 
521, 525–26 (2nd Cir. 1994) (link) (explaining the history of the CAA amendments and describing how 
California came to be the only state with the ability to regulate auto emissions). 
56  See 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (link); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 17 F.3d. at 525. 
57  See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, §§ 1900, 1961, 1961.1 (2005). 
58  See, e.g., CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 22a-174-36b (2006); 06-096-127 ME. CODE R. § 127 (Weil 
2006); 2007 MD. LAWS Ch. 111 (S.B. 103); 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.40 (2006) (link); N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE § 7:27-29 (2006) (link); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 218-8 (2006); OR. ADMIN. R. 
340-257-0100 (2006) (link); 25 PA. CODE §§ 126.411–412 (2006) (link); R.I. LOW EMISSION VEHICLE 
PROGRAM, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL REG. NO. 37 (2006) (link); VT. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL REGS., 
Subch. XI and App. F (2006) (link); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 173-423-010 (2006) (link). 
59  Erica Werner, California Urges EPA to Approve Waiver, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 23, 2007, at 
A5 (link). 
60  Letter from Catherine Witherspoon, Executive Officer, California Air Resources Board, to 
Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator, EPA (Dec. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/docs/waiver.pdf (link). 
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the decision under review in Massachusetts.  As a result, California and all 
states interested in piggybacking were prevented from creating their own 
law as the CAA permits.61 
It is clear, of course, that although the EPA has never denied a prior 
request from California under this section,62 it might nevertheless find rea-
son to deny this one.63  But the point is that the EPA would not even con-
sider California’s request unless and until the EPA decision regarding 
Section 202 was vacated.  When the Massachusetts decision did just that, 
the EPA announced within two days of the decision that it would notice 
California’s request and schedule both a public comment period and public 
hearing as required under Section 209(b)(1).64 
This issue is so important to California that Governor Arnold Schwar-
zenegger threatened to sue if the EPA fails to grant its request by October,65 
a move applauded even outside the state.66  In addition, the Senate Commit-
tee on Environmental and Public Works convened hearings to discuss the 
EPA response to California’s request.  The Committee chairwoman, none 
other than Senator Barbara Boxer of California, opened the proceedings by 
stating that California’s “application for a waiver clearly meets the legal 
standards for approval, and should be granted.”67  Accordingly, while the 
potential loss of state property and probable damage to residents’ well-
 
61  Cf. Samantha Young, EPA Revives Request for Tough Emission Regs, CINCINNATI POST, Apr. 4, 
2007, at A15 (reporting that “[t]he EPA had blocked California’s . . . request” but that the Massachusetts 
decision “pushed the EPA to allow California to proceed with its request”). 
62  Editorial, Bold Leadership on Emissions, WASH. POST, May 22, 2007, at A14 (link) (“Every re-
quest by California has been granted—more than 40 in three decades.”). 
63  See Examining the Case for the California Waiver:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Env’t and 
Pub. Works, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Jonathan H. Adler, Professor of Law, Case Western Re-
serve University Law School), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction 
=Hearings.Home (follow “5/22/07” hyperlink; then follow “Examining the Case for the California 
Waiver” hyperlink) (link) (noting that the provision allowing California to request permission to set its 
own standards “is not a blank check” and asserting that “[b]ecause California cannot demonstrate that 
controls on vehicular emissions of greenhouse gases are necessary to meet any ‘compelling and extraor-
dinary conditions,’ the EPA would have ample justification for denying California’s . . . request”). 
64  See Young, supra note 61, at A15.  EPA noticed California’s request on April 30, 2007, and an-
nounced that it will accept comments on it until June 15, 2007.  Notice of California State Motor Vehi-
cle Pollution Control Standards; Request for Waiver of Federal Preemption; Opportunity for Public 
Hearing, 72 Fed. Reg. 21,260 (Apr. 30, 2007) (link).  It scheduled two public hearings, one to be held on 
May 22, 2007, and the other to be held on May 30, 2007.  Notice of California State Motor Vehicle Pol-
lution Control Standards; Request for Waiver of Federal Preemption; Opportunity for Public Hearing, 72 
Fed. Reg. 26,626 (May 10, 2007) (link). 
65  Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California, to Stephen L. Johnson, Administra-
tor, EPA (Apr. 25, 2007) available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/6031/ (link). 
66  See, e.g., Editorial, Bold Leadership on Emissions, WASH. POST, May 22, 2007, at A14 (asserting 
that “[h]e’d be more than justified in suing” the EPA). 
67  See Opening Statement:  Hearing on Examining the Case for the California Waiver, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer, Chair, Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works), available at 
http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Home (follow “5/22/07” hyperlink; then 
“Barbara Boxer” hyperlink) (link). 
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being over the long-term as a result of climate change are important to the 
states, California’s actions demonstrate that the key and most urgent issue 
in this litigation is determining who may regulate in response to global cli-
mate change. 
Because the CAA allows California to create its own laws with respect 
to motor vehicle emissions and other states to adopt those standards, we 
think the Court should have examined whether California and the piggy-
backing states had a sovereign interest at stake in this case.  If the Court 
concluded that there was a sovereign interest at stake, as we believe there is, 
there would have been no need for any state to satisfy the Lujan require-
ments and thus no need to create a Lujan-lite analysis for states. 
D. Final Reflections on Standing 
In general, even though the Court’s approach to standing came with the 
unexpected creation of a Lujan-lite standard, we agree with the Court’s 
adoption of Professor Merrill’s suggestion with respect to the assertion of 
quasi-sovereign interests by states in federal courts.  Going forward, we 
imagine that the Court will continue to consider the proper category into 
which a state’s asserted interest falls and to further develop how those cate-
gories might be used to frame the standing analysis.  In this regard, we sug-
gest that the Court reevaluate some of the confusing language in Snapp in 
order to make the line between quasi-sovereign and sovereign interests 
more clear.  Ultimately, if the Court adopts a clear framework based on the 
type of state interest at stake, we believe its state standing jurisprudence 
will become more cohesive and understandable. 
II. RAMPED UP REVIEW OF RULEMAKING DENIALS 
A second aspect of Massachusetts that we predict will likely have 
long-term implications for administrative law involves the Court’s willing-
ness to thoroughly scrutinize the reasons that the EPA offered for denying 
the petition to regulate greenhouse gases.  The D.C. Circuit (which is by far 
the most important court in the country when it comes to shaping adminis-
trative law) established years ago that courts may review inaction in the 
rulemaking context—albeit only through a highly deferential and very nar-
row version of “arbitrary and capricious” review.68  The D.C. Circuit has 
explained that constrained review, rather than searching review, is appro-
priate because the decision whether to engage in rulemaking boils down to 
 
68  See, e.g., Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. v. FERC, 388 F.3d 903, 910–11 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (link); Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 
93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4–5 (D.C. Cir. 1987); WWHT, Inc. 
v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 816–17 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  See generally Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unre-
viewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 763–68 (1990) (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s 
treatment of the issue of the reviewability of denials of rulemaking petitions). 
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a legislative judgment that may turn on a variety of policy considerations 
ill-suited to judicial review, such as resource allocation concerns.69 
Despite the D.C. Circuit’s well-settled views on the topic, the Supreme 
Court prior to Massachusetts had never explicitly weighed in on whether an 
agency’s denial of a rulemaking petition is subject to review, and if so, what 
standard of review should apply.70  The Supreme Court’s pronouncements 
on the topic in Massachusetts accordingly merit attention.  In a nutshell, the 
Court—following the lead of the D.C. Circuit—declared that refusals to 
promulgate rules are susceptible to judicial review but that such review is 
limited and very deferential.71 
Given the D.C. Circuit’s established views on the topic, we are not 
surprised that the Court in Massachusetts made clear that an agency’s deci-
sion not to engage in rulemaking should be subject to some kind of judicial 
review.72  What we find surprising, however, is the level of scrutiny that the 
Court applied when reviewing the EPA’s reasons for declining to regulate.  
To be sure, the Court articulated a verbal formula that sounds quite con-
strained:  refusals to promulgate rules are susceptible only to “extremely 
limited” and “highly deferential” review.73  The Court’s actual review of the 
EPA’s reasons for declining to regulate, however, was meticulous and prob-
ing—a far cry from what one would expect of “highly deferential” review. 
In its detailed review of the EPA’s decision to decline to regulate emis-
sions from new motor vehicles, the Court analyzed two reasons offered by 
the EPA to justify its inaction.  First, the EPA concluded that it lacked the 
statutory authority to regulate because the emissions are not “air pollutants” 
as that term is used in the CAA.74  Second, the EPA justified its inaction by 
relying on a long list of policy considerations—ranging from a desire to 
avoid piecemeal regulation to concerns about interfering with the Presi-
dent’s foreign policy initiatives—that convinced the EPA that it would be 
unwise to regulate at this time, even if it did have the statutory authority to 
act.75 
 
69  See, e.g., NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046–48 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
70  The Supreme Court had previously held in Heckler v. Chaney that an agency’s decision not to ini-
tiate an enforcement proceeding is not ordinarily subject to judicial review. 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (link).  
Although the Court in Heckler expressly left open the question of the reviewability of a rulemaking de-
nial, id. at 825 n.2, many of the Court’s observations in Heckler as to why a decision not to enforce 
should not be subject to review could have equally been applied to an agency’s decision not to initiate a 
rulemaking.  For example, both an agency’s decision not to enforce and an agency’s decision not to en-
gage in rulemaking may simply reflect the agency’s own assessment of how its limited resources best 
should be allocated.  Thus, after Heckler, there was reason to think that Heckler could be extended to 
decisions to refuse to engage in rulemaking.  See Levin, supra note 68, at 762–63. 
71  Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1453, 1459 (2007). 
72  Id. 
73  Id. (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers, 883 F.2d at 96). 
74  Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles 
and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925–29 (Sept. 8, 2003) (link). 
75  Id. at 52,929–31. 
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With respect to the EPA’s claim that it lacked statutory authority to 
regulate, we think it was proper for the Court to carefully scrutinize the 
EPA’s reasoning.  The Court, after all, faced a purely legal issue:  Did the 
CAA authorize the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases or not?  This ques-
tion, of course, could be resolved through traditional statutory construction 
by looking at the plain language of the CAA.  That is, the Court had to do 
little more than analyze the statutory text (which is easily susceptible to ju-
dicial review) in order to assess and ultimately reject the agency’s claim 
that it lacked the statutory authority to regulate.  In this sense, the Court’s 
willingness to subject the EPA’s statutory justification to significant scru-
tiny does not break any new ground.  Rather, it simply applies a rule that 
the D.C. Circuit has long embraced:  A refusal to institute a rulemaking 
may be overturned where the agency has made a “plain error[] of law, sug-
gesting that the agency has been blind to the source of its delegated 
power.”76 
We, however, cannot say the same of the Court’s scrutiny of the EPA’s 
second reason for declining to regulate.  Here, the EPA did not rely upon 
any clear statutory text, legal principles, or specific factual findings that the 
Court could easily subject to judicial review.  Rather, the EPA’s second 
reason for declining to regulate turned on various policy considerations that 
convinced the EPA that regulating greenhouse gases at this time would be 
unwise.77 
In reviewing the EPA’s policy determinations, the Court acknowledged 
the EPA’s “laundry list” of reasons not to regulate.78  However, the Court 
quickly dismissed all of these considerations, declaring that they were “di-
vorced from the statutory text.”79  The Court’s reliance on the statutory text 
here is interesting; the relevant statutory text provides only that the Admin-
istrator of the EPA “shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable to 
the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor ve-
hicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or con-
tribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare.”80  Thus, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dis-
sent, the relevant statutory text makes it quite clear that when the Adminis-
trator actually “makes a judgment whether to regulate greenhouse gases, 
that judgment must relate to whether they are air pollutants that ‘cause, or 
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
 
76  Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal quotation omitted). 
77  68 Fed. Reg. at 52,930–32 (link).  None of the policy considerations were easily susceptible to 
judicial review because, as the Court itself admitted, the Court lacked “the expertise [and] the authority 
to evaluate” such policy judgments.  Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1463. 
78  Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1462. 
79  Id. 
80  42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (link). 
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public health or welfare.’”81  However, the statute “says nothing at all about 
the reasons for which the Administrator may defer making a judgment.”82 
Despite the statute’s apparent silence on the issue of when the EPA can 
defer making a judgment, the Court read the statutory text to mean that 
Congress tightly constrained the EPA’s discretion to defer.  Specifically, 
the Court declared that once the EPA decides to act on a petition for rule-
making under Section 202 of the CAA, the EPA can deny the petition for 
rulemaking and thereby avoid taking further action only if (a) it determines 
that greenhouse gases do not contribute to global warming, or (b) it pro-
vides some “reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise 
its discretion to determine whether they do.”83  In other words, the Court 
seemed to be warning the EPA that, even though the agency possesses sig-
nificant discretion to rely on policy considerations to decide when it wants 
to respond to rulemaking petitions, it loses that discretion once it actually 
acts on a petition. 
Here, in acting on the rulemaking petition, the EPA plainly had not de-
termined whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming, nor did 
the Court think that the EPA had offered “a reasoned justification for de-
clining to form a scientific judgment.”84  The EPA’s policy concerns sug-
gested reasons why the EPA might prefer not to regulate at this time, but 
the concerns did not—according to the Court—demonstrate that the EPA 
could not form a reasoned scientific judgment as to whether greenhouse 
gases contribute to global warming.85  Thus, none of the EPA’s reasons for 
declining to regulate survived the Court’s exacting review. 
Perhaps the Court’s willingness to apply such rigorous review is lim-
ited to the specifics of this case, namely the immense importance of global 
warming.  In other words, there are petitions—and then there are petitions.  
When an agency denies a petition for rulemaking on a relatively small is-
sue, such as an issue that involves only a narrow kind of economic regula-
tion, the reviewing court is unlikely to be as troubled by the denial, even 
when denials are based on policy considerations.  But when an agency is 
presented with very big issues that impact public health or safety—such as 
the EPA being presented with what is, according to many commentators, 
the most important environmental issue of the century—the courts might be 
willing to review the agency’s decision more closely.86  Although the 
 
81  Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1473 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)). 
82  Id. 
83  Id. at 1462.  To the extent this means that the EPA’s discretion to pursue other priorities of the 
Administration or the President would be constrained, that was congressional design, the Court said. 
84  Id. at 1463. 
85  Id. 
86  Cf. Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 103 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that the court will act to overturn an agency judgment not to institute a rule-
making only in rare and compelling circumstances, such as when “grave health and safety problems” 
exist). 
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Court’s opinion does not state in so many words that this is what is driving 
its analysis, it may nevertheless serve as a basis to distinguish the case in 
the future.  The problem, of course, with trying to use this distinction in the 
future is that the line between “important” and “unimportant” subjects is 
amorphous and malleable, and thus it may be nearly impossible to deter-
mine ahead of time when something will be “big” or “important” enough in 
a court’s eyes to warrant closer judicial scrutiny. 
An alternative (and perhaps more useful) means of restricting the 
Court’s seemingly rigorous standard of review might be found at the end of 
the opinion.  There the Court notes that it did not reach the question of 
whether “policy concerns can inform EPA’s actions in the event that it 
makes” an endangerment finding.87  In other words, the Court seems to 
leave the door open for the agency to decline to regulate for policy reasons 
even if it concludes that greenhouse gases contribute to climate change.  
Accordingly, perhaps the Court merely read Section 202 to require the EPA 
to first make a scientific judgment (or to explain why it has not) before 
turning to policy considerations.88  Or perhaps the Court simply wants to 
see the expert agency “do the work” in its area of expertise before turning to 
policy considerations.  In either scenario, it seems possible that the Court’s 
decision might allow policy reasons to be considered, but only after the 
agency uses its expertise to render a judgment on the technical issue before 
it.89 
Besides trying to determine whether the Court’s searching review ap-
plies broadly or narrowly, the Court’s approach raises two other major 
questions.  First and foremost, it remains to be seen what will and what will 
not qualify as a “reasonable” explanation in other cases when an agency de-
clines to regulate in the future.  Although the Court’s opinion casts doubt on 
whether policy-driven considerations, like agency agenda setting and re-
source allocation issues, can constitute a “reasonable” explanation for de-
clining to regulate in the context of Section 202 of the CAA, the Court’s 
opinion does not even hint at a general line between permissible and im-
permissible reasons to regulate.  As a result, future courts will need to clar-
ify what will and what will not count as good explanations for failing to 
regulate.  Specifically, does Massachusetts completely remove policy-
driven considerations from the permissible calculus of reasons not to regu-
late?  Or does it permit policy reasons to be considered, but only after the 
 
87  Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1463. 
88  See generally William V. Luneburg, Petitioning Federal Agencies for Rulemaking:  An Overview 
of Administrative and Judicial Practice and Some Recommendations for Improvement, 1988 WIS. L. 
REV. 1, 48 (1988) (“By statute an agency may have very substantial, or total, discretion not to act, or, 
when acting, to act in particular ways.”). 
89  We note that the Court leaves open the possibility that scientific uncertainty might justify the 
EPA’s refusal to determine whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming.  See Massachusetts, 
127 S. Ct. at 1463 (“If the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from making a rea-
soned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming, EPA must say so.”). 
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agency does the hard scientific or technical calculus that is at the core of its 
expertise?  Or does the decision simply tell us that the analysis will vary by 
the specific statutory command at issue? 
For example, it is unclear whether it will be permissible for the EPA on 
remand to conclude that emissions of greenhouse gases do contribute to 
global warming, but decline to regulate greenhouse gases on the ground that 
the agency’s resources are constrained and that the agency cannot possibly 
do everything that Congress has empowered it to do.90  On the one hand, if 
this is not permissible, the work of agencies will become exponentially 
more difficult since they will have to act on every potentially legitimate pe-
tition.  On the other hand, if it turns out that such a justification is a permis-
sible reason not to regulate, then agencies might well choose in the future to 
rest their decisions not to regulate on this type of not-so-easily reviewable 
ground so as to better insulate their decisions from searching judicial re-
view.  We are stuck, it seems, between the proverbial rock and a hard place. 
A second significant question that we think flows from the Court’s de-
cision has to do with whether rigorous review of agency inaction in the 
rulemaking context will create perverse incentives for agencies.  The 
Court’s opinion made clear that—because the EPA was not required by 
statute to act on the rulemaking petition within a certain timeframe—the 
EPA enjoyed significant latitude as to the timing and manner of its regula-
tions.91  Once the EPA decided to act on the rulemaking petition, however, 
it opened the door to a challenge to its reasons for declining to regulate.92  A 
key lesson that agencies may well take away from Massachusetts, accord-
ingly, could be as follows:  Whatever discretion you enjoy prior to taking 
action on a rulemaking petition may well disappear once you affirmatively 
rule on a petition.  If this is the lesson that agencies glean from Massachu-
setts, then agencies may well feel as if they should delay ruling on petitions 
for rulemaking for as long as possible—perhaps until a court finds that the 
agency has unreasonably delayed agency action.93 
We should note that if agencies do choose to sit on rulemaking peti-
tions, agencies may be able to sit idle for quite some time.  This is because, 
even if an agency is operating under a statutorily-imposed deadline, a man-
datory statutory deadline is only one factor considered under the predomi-
nant test applied by courts when reviewing claims of unreasonable agency 
delay.94  Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently handed down a decision 
 
90  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120) 
(Justice Ginsburg asks whether the EPA on remand could simply state that it needed to devote its limited 
resources elsewhere). 
91  Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1462. 
92  Id. (“[O]nce EPA has responded to a petition for rulemaking, its reasons for action or inaction 
must conform to the authorizing statute.”). 
93  See generally 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (link) (providing that a reviewing court may “compel agency ac-
tion unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”). 
94  See Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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that makes it tough to get any review of agency inaction, unless the agency 
fails to take discrete action that it is required to take.95 
The key take-away from all of this should be fairly apparent:  The 
Court’s ramped up review of agency inaction ironically may not lead to bet-
ter reasoning by agencies with respect to denials of rulemaking petitions.  
Rather, the Court’s willingness to scrutinize the EPA’s inaction in the rule-
making context may simply mean that agencies will increasingly delay rul-
ing on petitions, and that parties seeking rulemaking proceedings may well 
have to wait even longer before the agency offers reasons to justify its dis-
posal of the petition. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Although it will be some time before we know whether the Court’s 
much-touted “global warming” decision ever leads to regulation of green-
house gases, either under the current CAA or under new legislation, the 
significance of the decision will not be short-lived.  Rather, we believe that 
the Court’s opinion will likely have a long-term impact on both (1) the spe-
cial Article III standing that States enjoy in federal courts, and (2) the level 
of scrutiny that agencies may face when justifying decisions not to engage 
in rulemaking.  When added together, these two doctrinal developments re-
sult in an interesting mix.  States are left in a relatively powerful position 
vis-à-vis federal agencies in terms of their ability both to file suits against 
agencies and to seek fairly exacting judicial review of the agency’s reasons 
for declining to regulate.  Although a twist on common perceptions about 
this case, fans of states’ rights ought to be quite pleased. 
 
95  Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (link). 
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